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P o l i c e  and Socie ty  i n  I s r a e l  and America 
Abs t r . ac t  
P o l i c e  i n  democratic s o c i e t i e s  a r e  fo rma l ly  accountable  t o  c i v i -  
l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  b u t  t he re  i s  a  d e l i c a t e  dilemma concerning t h e  proper 
degree  of  dependence o r  independence. - I f  p o l i c e  a r e  too dependent on 
c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y ,  we f a c e  t h e  s p e c t r e  of a  p o l i c e  s t a t e .  I f  c i v i l i a n  
a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  unable t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  p o l i c e ,  t h e  p o l i c e  can become a  
p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e  wi thout  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  This  paper  explores  two s e t s  of 
c o n d i t i o n s . a f f e c + i n g  t h e  degree of c o n t r o l  of p o l i c e :  those  charac te r -  
i s t i c s  of a  s o c i e t y  t h a t  determine t h e  gene ra l  c o n t r o l  of p o l i c e  by c i v i -  
l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  and those v a r i a b l e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  determine t h e  degree of 
c o n t r o l  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  groups on p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e s .  P o l i t i -  
c i z a t i o n ,  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  and c o n t i n u i t y  of p o l i t i c a l  power a r e  t he  gen- 
e r a l  cond i t i ons  explored; t he  r e f l e c t i o n  of  s o c i e t a l  c leavages wi th in  
c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y ,  p o l i t i c a l  sub-cul ture  among t h e  po l i ce ,  rank and f i l e  
p o l i c e  o rgan iza t ion ,  and normative commitment t o  due process  among t h e  
p o l i c e  a r e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  d i scussed .  We examine t h e  p o l i c e  i n  
I s r a e l i  s o c i e t y  and compare them w i t h  American p o l i c e  a s  a  means of il- 
l u s t r a t i n g  and e l abora t ing  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  argument. 
P o l i c e  and. Socie ty  i n  I s r a e l  and America 
We began s tudy ing  t h e  I s r a e l i  p o l i c e  w i th  a  hope and expec- 
t a t i o n  t h a t  we would uncover some i n t e r e s t i n g  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  American 
p o l i c e .  And indeed t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b u t  t h e  under ly ing  s i m i -  
l a r i t i e s  o v e r r i d e  these .  There is  a  c e r t a i n  u n i v e r s a l i t y  t o  s t an -  
dard p o l i c e  complaints ,  f o r  example, whether t h e  bea t  i s  t h e  Carmel 
Market i n  Tel  Aviv o r  Bedford-Stuyvesant. "Most c i t i z e n s  a r e  i n d i f -  
f  e r e n t  o r  h o s t i l e  and don;'t r e a l l y  understand a  policeman's job;" 
" the  p o l i c e  a r e  c a l l e d  on t o  do s o c i e t y ' s  d i r t y  work and then  g e t  
blamed f o r  doing t h e i r  job;" "ge t t i ng  c a l l e d  i n  on fami ly  f i g h t s  
i s  very unpleasant  and a  d ive r s ion  from ' r e a l '  p o l i c e  work." The 
complaints  a r e  t h e  same because the  na tu re  of t he  work and a t t e n d a n t  
s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  much t h e  same. 
But d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t  too and t h e s e  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  more en- 
l i g h t e n i n g  even i f  smal le r  i n  quant i ty .  The p a r t i c u l a r  d i f f e r e n c e  
t h a t  i n t e r e s t s  us  he re , conce rns  t he  s t r u c t u r e  of c o n t r o l  over  t h e  
p o l i c e  and how t h i s  a f f e c t s  t h e  playing o u t . o f  major s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s  
i n  a  s o c i e t y .  
P o l i c e  i n  modern democratic s o c i e t i e s  have an  unquestioned, 
l e g i t i m a t e  r i g h t . t o  use f o r c e  a g a i n s t  c i v i l i a n s  provided i t - i s  done 
i n  s p e c i f i e d ,  l e g a l  ways. Furthermore, they  possess  a  monopoly on 
t h i s  r i g h t  and t h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  anc i en t  ques t ion ;  of "Who Guards t h e  
Guards?" The problems, Alber t  Reiss sugges ts ,  c e n t e r  on "maintain- 
i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  n e u t r a l i t y  of the  po l i ce ,  t h e . u s e  of  l e g a l  means 
i n  p o l i c e  behavior  toward c i t i z e n s ,  and t h e  assurance  t h a t  t h e  po- 
l i c e  w i l l  u se  u n i v e r s a l  c r i t e r i a  i n  t h e i r  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  apply t h e  
law" (1971, Page 2) .  
I n  p rac t i ce , .  of course,  t h e  p o l i c e  a r e  not  always p o l i t i c a l l y  
n e u t r a l  and u n i v e r s a l i s t i c  i n  t h e i r  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  apply t h e  law. The . 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  t reatment  of cha l lenging  groups o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  by t h e  
p o l i c e  may o r i g i n a t e  e i t h e r  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c e  o r  w i t h ' t h e  c i v i l i a n  
. . 
. .. 
a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  which p o l i c e  a r e  accountable .  I n  t h e  f i r ' s t  case ,  
depa r tu re s  from n e u t r a l i t y  d e r i v e  from w i t h i n  t h e  police--from in-  
t e r n a l  sen t iments  and suppor t ing  s t r u c t u r e s .  For example, a  s p e c i f i c  
group may be regarded by p o l i c e  a s  dangerous t o  t h e i r  we l f a re  and 
t o  t h e  s o c i a l  o rde r  more gene ra l ly .  I n  t h e  second case ,  t h e  p o l i c e  
may have no p a r t i c u l a r  a t t i t u d e  toward t h e  people involved; r a t h e r ,  
they a r e  merely being u t i l i z e d  by c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  promote 
t h e  l a t t e r s '  i n t e r e s t  o r  t h e i r  v e r s i o n  of  s o c i e t y ' s  i n t e r e s t .  A l -  
though we w i l l  n o t - d i s c u s s  i t  i n  t h i s  paper,  t h e r e  i s  a  t h i r d  po-. 
t e n t i a l  cause of p o l i c e  p a r t i s a n s h i p ;  p r e s s u r e s  exe r t ed  on p o l i c e  L 
by f o r c e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  formal a u t h o r i t y  system, e.g., crowds, in-  
t e r e s t  groups, and t h e  l i k e .  
P o l i c e  i n  democrat ic  s o c i e t i e s  a r e  everywhere formal ly  
accountable  t o  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s .  There i s  i n  t h i s  accountabi- 
l i t y  a  d e l i c a t e  dilemma concerning t h e  proper  degree  of  dependence 
o r  independence. I f  p o l i c e  a r e  too  dependent on c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y ,  
we f a c e  t h e  s p e c t r e  of a  p o l i c e  s t a t e .  C i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  
some c o u n t r i e s  a r e  not  above a sk ing  t h e  p o l i c e  t o  commit b u r g l a r i e s  
i n  p u r s u i t  of in format ion  t o  be  used a g a i n s t  domestic p o l i t i c a l  
opponents, o r  t o  des t roy  damaging and embarrassing evidence of 
h igh  crimes and misdemeanors. A d o c i l e  and l o y a l  p o l i c e ,  a c t i n g  
on behal f  of a  co r rup t  and unscrupulous c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y ,  adds 
up t o  no c i t i z e n  p r o t e c t i o n  a t  a l l  and t o  t h e  b a s i c  i n g r e d i e n t s  
of a  p o l i c e  s t a t e .  
But t h i s  i s  only  one horn of t h e  dilemma. When c i v i l i a n  
a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  unable  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  po l i ce ,  t h e  l a t t e r  can  be- 
come a  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e  wi thout  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  Given t h e  monopoly 
of l e g i t i m a t e  i n t e r n a l  f o r c e  which t h e , p o l i c e  possess ,  t h i s  horn 
o f f e r s  a n  equa l ly  f r i g h t e n i n g  prospec t - -unres t r ic ted  p o l i c e  tyranny,  
a  p o l i t i c a l  Mafia beyond t h e  reach  of the  law. 
The problem, then ,  i s  t o  f i n d  some system o f l p o l i c e  account-  
a b i l i t y  t h a t  avoids  bo th  horns--a s u f f i c i e n t  independence t o  in-  
s u l a t e  t h e  p o l i c e  a g a i n s t  p a r t i s a n  use ,  a  s u f f i c i e n t  dependence t o  
prevent  t h e  p o l i c e  from becoming a  p a r t i s a n  f o r c e  i n  t h e i r  own 
r i g h t .  The problem has  as much t o  do  wi th  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  so- 
c i e t y  and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  i n  which t h e  p o l i c e  o p e r a t e  a s  
i t  does wi th  p o l i c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f s .  
Conditions f o r  P a r t i s a n  Involvement by t h e  Pol ice*  
The success  of  a n  at tempt  by p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  em- 
ploy t h e  p o l i c e  f o r  p a r t i s a n  purposes depends, u l t i m a t e l y ,  on t h e  
degree t o  which t h e  p o l i c e  a r e  con t ro l l ed  by these  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
I n  spec i fy ing  t h e  s o c i a l  cond i t i ons  under which such c o n t r o l  i s  
*We use  t h e  term "par t i san"  no t  i n  t he  narrow sense  of 
favor ing  a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  b u t  i n  t h e  broader s ense  of any i n t e r -  
ven t ion  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  outcome between contending p a r t i e s  i n  a  
p o l i t i c a l  o r  s o c i a l  con f l i c t - - i n  s h o r t ,  a c t s  of i n f luence  r a t h e r  
than  of s o c i a l  c o n t r o l .  
likely to be'greater or smaller, it .seems useful to distinguish two 
classes of conditions: 
a. Those characteristics of society that determine the 
general control of police by civilian authorities, and 
b. Those situational and variable factors that determine 
the degree of control with respect to particular groups on particu- 
lar issues. In other words, given some general level of control 
over the police, we expect some.variation from situational factors 
to remain. We take up each class of conditions in turn. 
&.;? ...... ~ . . i  . . 
1. General Condi.tions,of Control Over the Police by Civilian Authorities 
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1.1 The greater the degree.of politicization and centralization of 
a socie.t.y,,--..the gr ater. - -th.e. control over police by civilian authorities. 
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to.:thel relat'ive 'importance of Phe political sphere vis-a-vis other 
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The dominance of political institutions.implies also that 
;30cj~ i - ,z i  , , . : i+j- i :~ir;  ye-< ~ f i L y ~ f l ~ ~ 2 y ~ 2 c ~ . : : - :  ::.>-&., ,; ::2 :.~:*;::::!.%'~!. ~i3: 
individual members of society are "politically minded," usilig poli; .. ... , r l) 0 2 . l . G .  Z.1: 69k3 5J-i;.iiJ2 9,iL: zxf>;?;,<< !,5:.:3;~yif~ %c ~ i . . , ~ ~ A ~ , r : i : ~ . . i . i  i:: -a:~3'''y'L-. 
-. 
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variety of situations. Thus, if the government takes an action that 
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is inconsistent with, say, economic efficiency, the public wou$- judge 
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that action by its political significance rather than emphasi~ing~its 
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economic consequences. I n  o ther  words, p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of soc ie ty  i s  
l i k e l y  to  reduce tbe  c i t i z e n s '  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  non-poli t ical  consider- 
a t ions ,  thereby f a c i l i t a t i n g  governmental penetra t ion and regula t ion 
of the pol ice  a s  wel l  a s  a  host  of o ther  sub-system. 
I f  the  p o l i t i c a l  system i s  not-only d~minan t  but a l so  highly 
cen t ra l i zed ,  the organizat ional  b a s i s  f o r  e f f ec t i ve  control  by c iv i -  
l i a n  au tho r i t i e s  is fu r t he r  enhanced. That is, a  centra l ized po- 
l i t i c a l  system is typ ica l ly  associa ted wi th  organizat ional  too l s  
and mechanisms by which t he  au tho r i t i e s  can maintain t t g h t  con t ro l  
over various governmental sub-systems, thus reducing t h e i r  autonomy 
and pos s ib i l i t y  of independent act ion.  A centra l ized p o l i t i c a l  
system is typ ica l ly  characterized by the  tendency to  c en t r a l i z e  
a l l  of i t s  organizat ional  un i t s .  Such a  system i s  l i k e l y  t o  have, 
therefore ,  a  centra l ized po l ice  system the  heads of which a r e  c lose ly  . 
accountable t o  p o l i t i c a l  author i ty .  The combination of centra l iza-  
t i o n  and of p o l i t i c i i a t i o n  i n  socie ty  r e s u l t s  i n  a  system tha t  i s  
both s t r u c t u r a l l y  (cen t ra l i za t ion  e f f e c t )  and normatively ( p o l i t i -  , 
c h a t i o n  e f f ec t )  ripe f o r  a  high degree of dependence by the po l ice  
on the  0 1 i t i c a l . g q t h o r i t i e s .  p :- . r 
1.2 The g r ea t e r  the continuity of p o l i t i c a l  power, the  
g r e a t e r  the  control  over pol ice  by c i v i l i a n  au tho r i t i e s .  
The l ikelihood of g rea te r  subordination by c i v i l i a n  authori-  
t i e s  i s  a l s o  dependent onr-the fr'ehuency of turnover among the  ru l i ng  
pa r t i e s .  I f  the same party,  or coa l i t i on  of pa r t i e s ,  remains i n  
, - 
power over a  r e l a t i ve ly  long period, i t  becomes eas ie r  f o r  -the' 
- A . . b 
government to  maintain e f f ec t i ve  control  over -'the pol ice  £0; the 
*; 
following reasons: 
1.21) Under cond i t i ons  of  s t a b l e  government, t h e  organiza- 
t i o n a l  appa ra tus  and mechanisms of c o n t r o l  (e.g., personnel  s e l e c t i o n ,  
l i n e s  of communication, coord ina t ion  of  ro l e -de f in i t i ons )  tend t o  
be  more e f f i c i e n t ;  
1.22) When t h e  same government is  "here t o  s t ay , "  t h e  p o l i c e  
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  l e s s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  p o t e n t i a l  c r i t i c i s m  and p r o t e s t  
from competing p o l i t i c a l  groups. The p o l i c e  i n t e r e s t  i n  co l labora-  
t i o n  wi th  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i s  g r e a t e r  under such circumstances,  s i n c e  
t h e  r i s k  e n t a i l e d  i n  enraging o t h e r  segments of t h e  power s t r u c t u r e  
i s  sma l l e r ;  
1.23) The longer  the  same government remains i n  power, 
t h e  more l i k e l y  i t  i s  t h a t  i t s  p o l i c i e s  w i l l  become i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  
t h e  well-being of  t h e  syst;rn a s  a  whole. That is,  under such condi- 
t i o n s ,  i t  becomes more d i f f i c u l t  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a f e  between s p e c i f i c  
a c t s  and p o l i c i e s  f u r t h e r i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  r u l i n g  p a r t y  and 
more gene ra l  p r i n c i p l e s  under ly ing  t h e  leg i t imacy of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
o rde r .  
The degree  of p o l i t i c i z a t i o n ,  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  and s t a b i l i t y  
a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have independent e f f e c t s  on t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  
p o l i c e  a r e  i n s u l a t e d  from governmental c o n t r o l .  Yet,  i t  i s  reasonable  
t o  hypothes ize  an  i n t e r a c t i v e  e ' f fec t  such t h a t  t h e . c o e x i s t e n c e  of a  
h igh  degree of each of t hese  f a c t o r s  r e s u l t s  i n  a  g r e a t e r  amount of 
c i v i l i a n  c o n t r o l  over t he  p o l i c e  than  t h e i r  combined a d d i t i v e  e f f e c t s .  
2. Var iab le  Fac to r s  Determining P o l i c e  P a r t i s a n s h i p  i n  S p e c i f i c  S i t u a t i o n s  
Given some.genera1 l e v e l  of c i v i l i a n  c o n t r o l  of t h e  p o l i c e ,  
a c t u a l  p o l i c e  p a r t i s a n s h i p  i n  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s  w i l l  vary  depending 
on t h e  fol lowing:  
2.1 The more t h a t  s o c i e t a l  cleavages a r e  r e f l e c t e d  wi th in  
t h e  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y  over the  po l i ce ,  t h e  l e s s  t h e  l ike l ihood of 
p a r t i s a n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by the  po l i ce  i n  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s .  
When a u t h o r i t i e s  become involved i n  confronta t ions  wi th  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p e r s i s t e n t  chal lengers ,  they f r equen t ly  c a l l  upon the  
p o l i c e  ( i n  a  s e n s e ,  " the i r"  po l i ce )  t o  a c t  a g a i n s t  t h e  chal lenger .  
There a r e  times when i t  i s  c l e a r l y  i n  t h e  long run i n t e r e s t  of the  
p o l i c e  t o  delay in t e rven t ion .  
To make t h i s  p o i n t ,  we must in t roduce  an a d d i t i o n a l  con- 
cept--social cleavage. By s o c i a l  cleavage, we mean a  l a t e n t  d i v i -  
s i o n  i n  t h e  populat ion,  a  f a u l t  l i n e  along which s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  
c o n f l i c t s  tend to -  flow. A cleavage i s  d i f f e r e n t  from a  d i v i s i o n  on 
a  p a r t i c u l a r  pub l i c  i s s u e  which may o r  may not  a c t i v a t e  one of t h e  
more enduring, l a t e n t  d iv i s ions .  
To the  ex ten t  t h a t  major cleavages i n  t h e  s o c i e t y  a r e  re- 
f l e c t e d  among those  wi th  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  over t h e  po l i ce ,  i t  
becomes d i f f i c u l t  t o  use  t h e  po l i ce  a s  an  instrument t o  wage con- 
f l i c t .  Any given c o n f l i c t  runs the  danger of a c t i v a t i n g  a  major 
cleavage i f  i t  has no t  a l ready dbone so.  Once i t  does, the  po l i ce  
w i l l  f i n d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  d i v i s i o n  among those wi th  a u t h o r i t y  over 
them and a  too r ap id  response to  the  d e s i r e s  of one group w i l l  
qu ickly  b r i n g  upon i t  the  wrath of o the r s .  In t e rven t ion  is ,  thus,  
f raught  with r i s k s  f o r  the  po l i ce  and these  r i s k s  can be reduced by 
waiting--by i n s i s t i n g ,  f o r  example, on w r i t t e n  o rde r s .  The demand 
f o r  a  w r i t t e n  r eques t  involves a  c l e a r  r e j e c t i o n  of p o l i c e  responsi- 
b i l i t y  f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and i t s  p r a c t i c a l  e f f e c t  i s  f requent ly  delay.  
The delay removes immediate pressure  on the  p o l i c e  and allows time 
f o r  t h e  a c t i v a t i o n  of counter-forces among t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  which 
may n e u t r a l i z e  the  o r i g i n a l  pressure  f o r  p o l i c e  ac t ion .  The n e t  
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r e s u l t  is  t h a t  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  s u c h . a  s i t u a t i o n  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  
p r e s s  f o r  p o l i c e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l ace  and t h a t  p o l i c e  a r e  
l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  respond r ap id ly  and eage r ly  given t h e  p o t e n t i a l  c o s t s  
from t h e i r  s t andpo in t .  
2 . 2  The g r e a t e r  t h e  degree t o  which t h e r e  i s  a  d i s t i n c t i v e  
p o l i t i c a l  sub-cul ture  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i c e ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t he  l i k e l i h o o d  
of p a r t i s a n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by t h e  p o l i c e  i n  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s .  
The ' sub-cul tura l  d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s  of t h e . p o l i c e  only i n t e r e s t s  
u s  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  r ep resen t s  a  d i s t i n c - t ,  normative view on 
s o c i a l  i s s u e s  i n  t h e  l a r g e r  soc i e ty .  P o l i c e ,  l i k e  any o t h e r  work 
group, have a s e r i e s  of norms concerning t h e  hhndling of work sit-  
ua t ions ,  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of fe l low o f f i c e r s ,  and t h e  l i k e .  We need 
a  narrower concept than  t h i s  which- we w i l l  c a l l  p o l i t i c a l  syb;culture. 
A d i s t i n c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  subcu l tu re  e x i s t s  when t h e r e  a r e , , n ~ r p a t + y ~ e + . ~  
p re s su res  t o  hold p a r t i c u l a r .  views on i s s u e s ;  on,.which I t h e r e >  i s  (a ,divi- 
4 
s ion .  .of op in ion  i n  t h e  l a r g e r .  :society,. ./ . . . , - ,: :,: .,, :$ .,-. 3 i,*:;?;yr &~~j ;y i~ l~J  
I 
. To speak of normative p fe s su re  -. i s l ! to  .imply some.Jh.iqg morei2:t. 
L 
than  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  poli-ce o p i n i o n , i s  P i s t r - i bu ted .  dif:f.erent&y f-ryom.ji& 
t h a t  of a  random sample- of t h e  populat,ion. Some p o l i c e  department>, 
i n  t h e  United S'tates;have bpen descr ibed  ,as "hotbeds 0.g "Bircher s e ~ t i -  
ment," &it. obse rva t ion  t h a t  would not  b e  , con t r ad ic t ed  ,bq showing &hat  - .  ..b - 
only  a minor i ty  a c t u a l l y  belongedi t o  , the  John Birch;.Societyt qf; len7~14 
dorsed i t s  views. The atmosphere is  theL  s o c i a l  f a c t  t o  . w h i ~ h t ~ w e ~ . ~ ,  
I V 
r e f e r  r a t h e r  than  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of pr iva t ,e ,  op in ion . ,  To: take, another  
, / 
example, Walsh (1969) has  shown t h a t  i n  some .police;.depar.tments;where 
only  a  minor i ty  voted f o r  George Wallace i n ,  t h e  1468 P res iden t i a l :  I : 
Elec t ion ,  most o f f i c e r s  perceived the  .Wallace suppor t e r s  i n ,  t h e i r  ..,: 
department a s  a n  overwhelming ma jo r i t y .  They f e l t  themselves- surrounded 
by .Wallace;. .enthusiasts :  e-v.en, :though: a.. ,m?j .pr.i..ty. ~.f:__~.th.e:ir: ~o:ll:eagues,,~ 
were a c t u a l l y ,  vo-ting-for- Humphrey; or- Nixon,  . Th-e. s h a r e d  p.ercept-ipn2, 
of a p o l i t i c a l  norm. , . , , : L ~ . - , ~ : ; : ~ , ~ G - ~ ~ ,  .. -. : ; . , . L ! i i - j  . - Gj<jm<'i, 
.:- ._._ c- :- .; ;:.;.:;A..dis.t _-__ . . . .  i n c  $- ive . -p~;L. i - t ica  _ _  ... ._.. . .._ s.ub-c.ul _. ,A __ t-ur.e. . __ p~.ojides~,.c.pllec,t  _._) .__  i v e  
.... .,I;;,L:>>:i .% * -  :> .;,<;I,. : ;!; ..:..:; ; I c , .  ....; - ,:;.;.;;: :. ,: ,,*...- r 3 - -  . . :,< ...i...,.A. !, ".- L ' - ' - ,  -'!':" -: %:..-;:2ii:(w . .  . .  .: ........... ..... .- ..... -. . - .. . 
support  for? . .-.i-int.e.~.v.ent.ion .... ..-. - ...-. .- .agains.t: -.. ..-: ,groups: .-i -. ... thatf.a.r,e:i.t.he, -a - ... .-sub j.ec_t-:o.f.:.,pqlice 
i ..... 
. .ho.s.tili.tyYy.;. .i-Public ... c o n f r o n t a t  $ens. ,p:royide :_the;:pqli.c.e. :w&:thi,an oppor- 
tunity-,fo.- p.unish~.s.uch gro.upsfrt.0 :''l-tea-c:h,cthem a -:lesson:!*--.u.nder; cove:rj 
'of ..p+e.rform$ng l ,egitimat.e. .police ,f.un,cti~ns.:;~.;;:i.; ?:is , 2 c  - - l ~ : , ~ : i  .!sIs:u,: 
... : , :-., : b 2 , .  3 . The: g r e a t e r , .  the.:p.ower :of: po1ic.e peer, .o!rganiza,t:ions?. s.u-ch 
as unions,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t he  l i ke l ihood  of p a r t i s a n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by 
. . . . . .  the.  p o l i c e  i n .  s o c i a l  ..con£ l i c t s  .. :., -:, . . .  : . .: ;. , ..: . . . . . . .  .-;,! + :!;::.; .; ;j:i 
Z.rj.2 .':L:.i.-~-Eol.i-ce: .a,Ee.. ev,erjywheper hi.erarLch5c.alJ11y :ozgan+z.edlIbut f he; :d.eg~;.ee ---.-- --z<La 
of., e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  i n  .these formal h i e r a r c h i e s  .var ies  cons ide rab ly .  
In. some ur,ban p o l i c e  departments i n  t h e  .United S . t a t e s , , f o r  example, 
t h e  head of t h e  p o l i c e  f o r c e  must. f a c e  the.. l i ke l ihood-  of ,  wide- scale 
suby,ersipn.,~.f.~! a.ny . ,e£f . o r t s  t h a t  ,conf 1 : .  s t r o n g  -wi th  -peer.: group norms 
among- t h e  *rank 'and f i l e . -  There may be s e r i o u s  r i s k s  f o r  t h e  command 
l e v e l ,  - in  d i s c i p l i - n i n g  o r  fi:ring_lo;qeer -ranking o f f i c e r s  , f o r  -"insubor- 
. n , :I: -Mwe ~specifically,~~.police,:unions, and benevo len t~~assoc ia t ions  
can proyide,  a power bVas.e.,.that l eg i t imizes ,  and makes e a s i e r  the- exer- 
:hierarchy., While .po l ice ,  ,donf8$ s t r i k e  ,. -they. havei.developed. a,:serbes 
of ,  , irgenio,us,;sanctions~ tha t*  at--e extremely d i 5 f i c u l t  t o i  c o n t r o l  .,! The 
11 b1ye:f-J..u~'., ,L.that:L,mys t e r i o u s  virus.!  thqf. a f f e c t s  police..'at times. of-:.:' 
disc(?t.enfi amongr;t@p ,ranI~-.and+E:~le ;b..o.r.. the2:pver~en.f o r  cement ao f .  - thev? 
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producing increased  pressure  on the  p o l i c e  command from outsiders--  
t hese  a r e . t y p i c a 1  examples of such devkges. 
2.4 The g r e a t e r  the  normative commitment of the  p o l i c e  t o  
a b s t r a c t  s tandards  of law and due process,  t h e  l e s s  the  l ike l ihood  
of p a r t i s a n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by the  p o l i c e  i n  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s .  
The commitment r e fe r red  t o  i s  t o  procedural  law and due pro- 
cess ,  not  merely t o  subs tan t ive  law. I n  a broad enough concept of 
p o l i c e  professional ism t h i s  would presumably be included. "The needed 
philosophy of professionalism," Jerome Skolnick (1967 p. 238) w r i t e s ,  
I I must r e s t  on a s e t  of values conveying t h e  idea  t h a t  the  p o l i c e  a r e  
a s  much an  i n s t i t u t i o n  dedicak?d t o  t h e  achievement of l e g a l i t y  i n  
s o c i e t y  a s  they a r e  a n  o f f i c i a l  s o c i a l  o rgan iza t ion  designed t o  con- 
t r o l  misconduct through the  invocat ion  of pun i t ive  sanct ions ."  
To summarize our t h e o r e t i c a l  argument, t h e r e  a r e  f i r s t  of 
a l l  c e r t a i n  genera l  s o c i e t a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  determine the  de- 
gree  of c o n t r o l  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i l l  e x e r c i s e  over t h e  po l i ce .  
We have suggested p o l i t i c i z a t i o n ,  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  .and  con t inu i ty  of 
p o l i t i c a l  power a s  the  ones we consider  paramount. I f  a s o c i e t y  i s  
very high on these  v a r i a b l e s ,  then we hypothesize t h a t  c i v i l i a n  con- 
t r o l  over the  p o l i c e  w i l l  be so h igh  t h a t  the re  is  no need t o  examine 
more s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n a l  elements. The p o l i c e  w i l l  have i n s u f f i c i e n t  
autonomy a s  an a c t o r  t o  make i t  worth examining t h e i r  ac t ions  . i n  
s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n s .  I f  they appear t o  a c t  i n  a p a r t i s a n  fashion,  i t -  
i s  merely the  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y  a c t i n g  i n  such a fashion  through 
t h e i r  a.gency. 
To the  ex ten t  t h a t  c i v i l i a n  c o n t r o l  over t h e  p o l i c e  i s  only 
p a r t i a l  and incomplete, i t  i s  worth examining more s p e c i f i c  v a r i a b l e s  
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t h a t  exp la in  why p o l i c e  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  i n t e rvene  i n  a  p a r t i s a n  
f a sh ion  i n  some s i t u a t i o n s  r a t h e r  than  o t h e r s .  We have cons idered  
fou r  such v a r i a b l e s :  t h e  r e f l e c t i o n  of s o c i e t a l  c leavages w i t h i n  
c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y ,  p o l i t i c a l  sub-cul ture  among t h e  p o l i c e ,  rank- 
and - f i l e  p o l i c e  o rgan iza t ion ,  and normative commitment t o  due pro- 
c e s s  among the  p o l i c e .  
We hope, by examining t h e  p o l i c e  i n  I s r a e l i  s o c i e t y  and 
comparing i t  wi th  what i s  known from va r ious  s t u d i e s  of American 
p o l i c e ,  t o  explore  and e l a b o r a t e  t h e  a b o v e . t h e o r e t i c a 1  argument. 
The P o l i c e  i n  I s r a e l  
Unlike American s o c i e t y  wi th  i t s  40,000 d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c e  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  I s r a e l  has  one--a n a t i o n a l ,  high@ c e n t r a l i z e d  p o l i c e  
o rgan iza t ion .  The o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  sub-divided both f u n c t i o n a l l y  and 
geographica l ly ,  b u t  t h e  h i e ra rchy  of command i s  t i g h t  and sub-divi- 
s i o n s  have l i m i t e d  autpnomy. 
* 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  headed by a n  Inspector-General,  a  p o l i c e  
c a r e e r  o f f i c e r  who has  he ld  a  v a r i e t y  of p o l i c e  p o s t s  en  r o u t e  t o  
t h e  top p o s i t i o n .  The formal r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y  i s  
somewhat complex. I s r a e l  i s  q u i t e  unusual i n  having a  s e p a r a t e  Min i s t e r  
of P o l i c e  r a t h e r  t han  subsuming t h i s  func t ion  under o t h e r  m i n i s t r i e s  
such as I n t e r i o r  o r  J u s t i c e .  The reasons  f o r  t h i s  a r e  somewhat i d io -  
s y n c r a t i c  and h i s t o r i c a l ,  having p a r t l y  t o  do wi th  t h e  n a t u r e  of 
c o a l i t i o n  goveriunent and t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s . i n  power a t  t h e  
beginning of t h e  s t a t e .  It is  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  purposes h e r e  t h a t  
t h e  p o l i c e  m i n i s t r y  has  remained u n d e r t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  dominant 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  and t h a t  t h e  ~ i n i s t e r  s e rves  an important  l i a i s o n  
func t ion  between t h e  p o l i c e  and t h e  cab ine t .  He i s ,  on t h e  one hand, 
a spokesman f o r  p o l i c e  i n t e r e s t s  and concerns i n  t h e  Cabinet and 
answers and defends t h e  p o l i c e  i n  t h e  Knesset ( t h e  I s r a e l i  p a r l i a -  
ment) and o t h e r  p u b l i c  p o l i t i c a l  forums; on t h e  o t h e r  hand, he i s  
a spokesman f o r  t h e  Cabinet and Prime Min i s t e r  i n  dea l ing  wi th  t h e  
p o l i c e .  
I s r a e l i  s o c i e t y  has been uniformly cha rac t e r i zed  by i t s  high 
degree  of p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  s i n c e  the  p r e - s t a t e  e r a .  I n  f a c t ,  i t  i s  d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  p o i n t  t o  a Western d e r n o c r a ~ y ~ t h a t  can  s u c c e s s f u l l y  compete 
w i t h  i t  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  During t h e  per iod  of t h e  B r i t i s h  Mandate, 
t h e  dominance of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sphere  w i t h i n  t h e  Jewish s e c t o r  of 
P a l e s t i n e  was due, mainly, t o  con t inua l  and i n t e n s i v e  o rgan iza t ion  
aimed a t  ach iev ing  p o l i t i c a l  independence. With the  es tab l i shment  
of t he  1 s r a e l i  s t a t e  i n  1948, t h e  problem of defense  and s e c u r i t y  
a g a i n s t  t h e  Arab world became prominent and cont inues  t o  remain so  
a f t e r  f o u r  major wars. Preoccupied wi th  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  problems, 
I s r a e l i s  have l ea rned  t o  perce ive  and e v a l u a t e  most events  through t h e  
vantage-point of n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  Such a tendency 
i s  expressed n o t  only i n  t h e  potency of t h e  common argument t h a t  t h e  
problem of n a t i o n a l  defense  and s e c u r i t y  h a s ' p r i o r i t y  over o t h e r  
a r e a s .  The p e n e t r a t i o n  of t h e  p o l i t y  goes beyond t h i s  widely shared 
f e e l i n g :  i t  means t h a t  behaviors  and p o l i c i e s  of groups.and organi- 
z a t i o n s  below t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  S t a t e  a r e  judged i n  terms of t h e i r  . . 
re levance  t o  n a t i o n a l  goa ls .  
Such a n  atmosphere i s  h ighly  conducive t o  d e v i a t i o n s  from 
s t anda rds  t h a t  would seem appropr i a t e  i n  o t h e r  societies. For ex- 
ample, economic i n e f f i c i e n c y ,  inc luding  was te  and corrupSion, i s  
o f t e n  defended and even j u s t i f i e d  on the  grounds t h a t  excess ive  concern 
with  such m a t t e r s  . w i l l  reduce the  . a b i l i t y  of t he  s o c i e t y  t o  absorb 
the  cont inuing  f low of immigrants. S imi l a r ly ,  i n t e r n a l  s o c i a l  problems 
such a s  economic and s o c i a l  i n e q u a l i t y  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  e t h n i c  groups 
have been overlooked f o r  a  long time--and n o t  only by t h e  government-- 
. . 
on t h e  grounds t h a t  t h e . p r i o r i t y  problems of  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  i m m i -  
g r a n t  absorp t ion ,  and ecanomic development r equ i r ed  t h e  postponement - 
of concer$ed e f f o r t s  on t h i s  f r o n t .  Given t h i s  c l imatk,  one should 
no t  be s u r p r i s e d  t o  d iscover  t h a t  c i v i l - s e r v i c e  and o the r  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
o rgan iza t ions  a r e  not  noted f o r  t h e i r  adherence t o  u n i v e r s a l i s t i c  and 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t anda rds  when t h e s e  happen t o  c o n f l i c t  w i th  p o l i t i c a l  
cons ide ra t ions .  
The I s r a e l i  p o l i c e  have func t ioned  h i s t o r i c a l l y  i n  t h i s  c l ima te .  
From i t s  very beginning, t h i s  o rgan iza t ion  has  been headed by o f f i c e r s  
who regarded t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e - p o l i t i c a l  r o l e  a s  more important  than  
t h e i r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  i d e n t i t y  should a  c o n f l i c t  a r i s e .  When t h e  I s r a e l i  
p o l i c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1948, i t  faced a  s p e c i a l  problem. 
On t h e  one hand o f f i c e r s  were sought who were experienced i n  p o l i c e  
work and t h i s  meant t u rn ing  t o  those  who had served  i n  t he  B r i t i s h  
c o l o n i a l  p o l i c e  f o r c e ;  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  new government sought 
o f f i c e r s  whose p o l i t i c a l  l o y a l t y  and sympathies had been proven i n  t h e  
f i g h t  f o r  independence. I n  a  manner t y p i c a l  of o the r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
spheres ,  a  s o l u t i o n  had a l r eady  been prepared i n  t h e  pre-Sta te  pe r iod .  
 an$ Jewish policemen en te red  the  f o r c e  a s  p a r t  of t h e i r  membership 
i n  t h e  Hagana--the major Jewish Defense Force dur ing  t h e  B r i t i s h  
mandate. These people,  i n  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e i r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  r o l e s  a s  
policemen and acqu i r ing  u s e f u l  experience i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  and or-  
'. 
g a n i z a t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  of p o l i c e  work, viewed t h e i r  r o l e  a s  a  means 
f o r  t h e  a t t a inmen t  of n a t i o n a l  goals--not merely pe r sona l  ca ree r  
goa ls .  There was no ques t ion  about t h e  l o y a l t y  of such people-- 
they  c l e a r l y  opposed t h e  B r i t i s h  regime even wh i l e  s e rv ing  i n  i t s  
p o l i c e  f o r c e .  I n  a  c a s e  of c o n f l i c t  between p o l i t i c a l  and profes-  
s i o n a l  o r  c a r e e r  cons ide ra t ions ,  c r i t e r i a  had c l e a r  p r i o r i t y .  
Even among those  who joined the  B r i t i s h  p o l i c e  by t h e i r  own i n i t i a t i v e ,  
membership i n  t h e  Hagana was t y p i c a l  w i th  s i m i l a r  consequences f o r  
t h e i r  subsequent r e s o l u t i o n  of any r o l e  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  might a r i s e .  
No c r i t i c i s m  is implied i n  po in t ing  ou t  t h a t  from t h e  incep t ion  of 
D 
t h e  I s r a e l i  p o l i c e ,  p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i a  have .been  c e n t r a l  i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of ' h ighe r  o f f i c e r s  wi th  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  and experience 
regarded a s  important  bu t  secondary. 
We do no t  i n t end  t o  imply t h a t  m o s t . o r  even many p o l i c e  ac- 
t i o n s  a r e  h e a v i l y  inf luenced  by p o l i t i c a l  cons ide ra t ions .  The over- 
whelming m a j o r i t y  of p o l i c e  a c t i o n s  have no p o l i t i c a l  r ami f i ca t ions .  
But when an  i s s u e  has imp l i ca t ions  f o r  n a t i o n a l  po l i cy ,  i t . i s  n a t u r a l  
f o r  top  p o l i c e  o f f i c i a l s  t o  assume a  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  from t h e  
o u t s e t  r a t h e r  than  c a s t i n g  the  i s s u e s  i n  t he  t e c h n i c a l  o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
terms of "law enforcement ." 
The p o l i t y  i n  I s r a e l  has  been n o t  only dominant bu t  a l s o  
h igh ly  c e n t r a l i z e d .  The government, through t h e  meilium of t h e  dom- 
i n a n t  l a b o r  p a r t y  and i t s  a f f i l i a t e d  groups, has been succes s fu l  i n  
concen t r a t ing  a  p o l i t i c a l  power t h a t  d i r e c t s  and r e g u l a t e s  s o c i a l  
f u n c t i o n s  i n  almost a l l  spheres  of l i f e . .  There a r e  no r e a l l y  s ign i -  
f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  power bases o u t s i d e  t h e  government, except  f o r  t he  
i n f l u e n c e  exer ted  by t h e  oppos i t ion  p a r t i e s .  Given t h e  c o n t i n u i t y  
i n  power of t h e  r u l i n g  c o a l i t i o n ,  even t h i s  oppos i t i on  i n f l u e n c e  i s  
p e r f o r c e  a l i m i t e d  one. Local government i s  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
Government c o n t r o l  over  t h e  func t ioning  of t h e  economy, f o r  example, 
i s  s o  pe rvas ive  t h a t  i t  is d i f f i c u l t  t o  regard  I s r a e l i  p r i v a t e  busi-  
n e s s  a s  "independent" i n  any meaningful sense .  Furthermore, t h e  
government i t s e l f  owns a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  of t h e  bus ines s  en t e r -  
p r i s e s  and o t h e r  forms of economic p rope r ty  (e .g. ,  l a n d ) .  The His ta -  
drut(Genera1 Labor Federa t ion)  which owns many economic o rgan iza t ions  
a n d p n r o l l s  t he  v a s t  ma jo r i t y  of h i r e d  l abo r  i n  I s r a e l ,  i s  i t s e l f  
c o n t r o l l e d  t o  a  v e r y  l a r g e  ex ten t  by t h e  government s i n c e  t h e  l abo r  
p a r t y  is i n  power i n  both  p laces .  
This  h igh  degree  of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  has  been a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  
an extremely s t a b l e  power s t r u c t u r e .  The l a b o r  p a r t y ,  which h a s  under- 
-gone va r ious  t ransformat ions  and mergers throughout t h e  yea r s ,  dominated 
the  p o l i t i c a l  a r ena  of  t he  Yishuv (p re - s t a t e  p e r i o d ) .  Although unable 
t o  s ecu re  an  a b s o l u t e  ma jo r i t y ,  i t  has  emerged a f t e r  every e lec t ion- -  
i nc lud ing  t h e  1973-e lec t ion- -as  t he  l a r g e s t  p a r t y .  It has thus been 
ass igned  t h e  r o l e  of forming t h e . r u l i n g  c o a l i t i o n .  Counting t h e  pre- 
s t a t e  per iod ,  t h i s  p a r t y  has been i n  power f o r  t h e  l a s t  f o r t y  yea r s .  
The impact of t hese  f a c t o r s  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between po- 
l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and t h e  p o l i c e  has  been obvious. Act ion ( o r  
d e l i b e r a t e  i n a c t i o n )  by the  p o l i c e  i n  5 i t u a t i o n s . o f  p o t e n t i a l  n a t i o n a l  
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  impact,  has  stemmed, d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  from the  
government. The system is ,  one .of  h igh  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  The Inspec tor -  
General i s  i n  d a i l y  communication w i t h  t h e  Minis te r  of P o l i c e  g iv ing  
a  fu l l -account  o f  bo th  p a s t  and p rospec t ive  p o l i c e  a c t i o n s .  Account- 
* 
a b i l i t y  i s  the  l i g h t e s t  and m o s t . s u b t l e  form of c o n t r o l  and i s  hard ly  
experienced a s  such. I n  t he  ~ n s ~ e c t o r - G e n e r a l ' s  view, he keeps t h e  
Min i s t e r  fu l ly- informed s o  t h a t  he  w i l l  always be  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  
answer any ques t ions  from p o l i t i c a l  co l l eagues  o r  t h e  p r e s s  about 
p o l i c e  a c t i v i t y .  H e  does not  a s k  t h e  Min i s t e r  of P o l i c e  how t h e  
p o l i c e  should a c t  i n  given s i t u a t i o n s . b u t  w i l l  inform him of p o l i c e  
p l a n s  on s e n s i t i v e  i s s u e s .  The Min i s t e r ,  i n  tu rn ,  dovs no t  i s s u e  
o r d e r s  b u t  may make sugges t ions  o r  express  any s p e c i a l  concerns of 
t h e  Cabinet t o  which the  p o l i c e  should be  e s p e c i a l l y  a t t e n t i v e .  D i s -  
agreements can a r i s e  and t h e  flow o f ' i n f l u e n c e  may be  two ways but  
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  conceive of t h e  p o l i c e  i gnor ing  t h e  expressed 
d e s i r e s  of t h e  Cabinet even a g a i n s t  t h e i r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  judgment. 
When P res iden t  Nixon approved t h e  so-ca l led  Houston p l an  f o r  domestic 
i n t e l l i g e n c e  inc luding  ex tens ive  e l e c t r o n i c  s u r v e i l l a n c e  and burg lary  
a s  techniques,  he f a i l e d  t o  implement i t  because of FBI Direc tor  J .  
Edgar Hoover's continued oppos i t ion .  No I s r a e l i  p o l i c e  o f f i c i a l ,  
p a s t  o r  p re sen t ,  has  had the  power t o  r e s i s t  and countermand a  con- 
s i d e r e d  d e c i s i o n  of t h e  Prime Min i s t e r  and Cabinet.  
"One important  d i f f e r e n c e  among p o l i c e  systems," David Bayley 
(1974) no te s ,  "is t h e  ex ten t  t o  which p o l i c e  t a s k s  inc lude  a n  a c t i v e  
r o l e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  a s  opposed t o  preoccupat ion p r imar i ly  wi th  
p reven t ion  of crime and t h e  maintenapce of pub l i c  order .  . .The French 
p o l i c e ,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  .have played &n a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  p o l i t i c s  s i n c e  
t h e i r  i ncep t ion ;  t h e  B r i t i s h  p o l i c e  have from time t o  time been t h r u s t  
i n t o  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  l a r g e l y  a s  a  r e s u l t  of widespread pub l i c  d i so rde r ,  
b u t  t h e . r o l e  has been slight\>!' 
Bayley sugges ts  two c e n t r a l  f a c t o r s - t h a t  account f o r  pe r s i s -  
t e n t  i n t r u s i o n  of the  p o l i c e  i n t o  p o l i t i c s .  The f i r s t  c e n t e r s  on t h e  
process  of p e n e t r a t i o n  by n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  throughout a  s o c i e t y  
- - e s sen t i a l l y  a  p roces s  of s t a t e  o r  n a t i o n  bu i ld ing .  Bayley sugges t s  
t h a t  i t  i s  c r i t i c a l  whether o r  no t  t h i s  p e n e t r a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  per iphery  
by t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c e n t e r  meets w i t h  v i o l e n t  r e s i s t a n c e .  
The s p e c i a l  c i rcumstances of s t a t e -bu i ld ing  i n  I s r a e l  make 
i t  a n  extreme c a s e  of non-resis tance t o  pene t r a t ion .  The s t a t e -  
bu i ld ing  process  was c a r r i e d  ou t  l a r g e l y  be fo re  a  s t a t e  e x i s t e d  and was 
p a r t  and p a r c e l  of t h e  f i g h t  f o r  independence. There was never  any 
need t o  employ t h e  p o l i c e  i n  t h i s  process-- i t  was e s s e n t i a l l y  an  
accomplished f a c t  by t h e  time t h e  I s r a e l i  p o l i c e  were formed. The 
p e c u l i a r  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  Mandate meant t h a t  t h e  I s r a e l i  p o l i c e  or-  
gan iza t ion  post-dated r a t h e r  than  preceded t h e  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of power 
by t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c e n t e r .  
A second f a c t o r  suggested by Bayley is  a  c u l t u r a l  one--the 
degree of " t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s i s t e n c e  i n  t he  country upon t h e  importance 
of r i g h t - b e l i e f .  Such a  t r a d i t i o n  j u s t i f i e s  s c r u t i n y  of ve ry  per- 
sona l  a s p e c t s  of i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s .  Where t h e  I n q u i s i t i o n  was s t r o n g ,  
t h e r e  p o l i c e  f o r c e s  a c t i v e  i n  p o l i t i c s  a r e  t o  be found from a n  e a r l y  
time" (1974). 
Again t h i s  f e a t u r e  i s  l a r g e l y  absent  i n  I s r a e l i  s o c i e t y .  
Some elements of t h e  r e l i g i o u s  community, most no tab ly  t h e  Ne tu re i  
Karta ("Guardians of t h e  Gate") r ep re sen t  such i n s i s t e n c e  b u t  t h e i r  
c laim is s t r o n g l y  r e s i s t e d  and is an  a r t i c l e  of con ten t ion  w i t h  o t h e r s .  
I n  a  s o c i e t y  w i t h  immigrants from so many d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s ,  c u l t u r a l  
p lu ra l i sm and t o l e r a n c e  of d i v e r s i t y  i s  both  a  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  coex i s t ence  
and a  p o s i t i v e  va lue  f o r  many. 
..' 
Nei ther  of t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , w h i c h  Bayley sugges ts  encourage 
t h e  p e r s i s t e n t  i n t r u s i o n  of t h e  p o l i c e  i n t o  p o l i t i c s  a r e  p re sen t  i n  
I s r a e l  t o  any s i g n i f i c a n t  degree. And indeed few i f  any would a rgue  
t h a t  such p e r s i s t e n t  . i n t r u s i o n  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t s .  Nevertheless ,  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  such p o l i t i c a l  u se  remains; ,wi th  i t s  h igh  p o l i t i c i z a -  
t i o n ,  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  and c o n t i n u i t y  of government, the  danger f o r  
I s r a e l  is  c l e a r l y  more one ,of p o l i c e  overdependence r a t h e r  than  in-  
dependence. 
U n t i l  t h e  time of Watergate, t h e  concern i n  t he  United S t a t e s  
has  been t h e  oppos i te .  I n  Cleveland, New York and o t h e r  c i t i e s  we 
have witnessed open r e b e l l i o n  of t h e  a g a i n s t  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y ;  
5n Phi l ade lph ia  and Milwaukee, a  p o l i c e  c a r e e r  has  proved a  s t epp ing  
s t o n e  t o  e l e c t i o n  a s  mayor a s  t h e  p o l i c e  have formed a l l i a n c e s  w i th  
s e c t i o n s  of t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  under t h e  code.words of "law and order ."  
The l e s s e r  c o n t r o l  of c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  over t h e  p o l i c e  
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  a  d i r e c t  r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  g r e a t e r  d e c e n t r a l i -  
za t ion ,  l e s s e r  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n ,  and turnover  of t h e  p a r t y  o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  
i n  power. The p o l i c e  system is  i t s e l f  h igh ly  decen t r a l i zed  wi th  over 
40,000 s e p a r a t e  p o l i c e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s .  Even though l o c a l  and s t a t e  
governments have much more independent power than any analogous u n i t s  
i n  I s r a e l ,  they a r e  hard put  t o  b r i n g  t h i s  power t o  bear  on many po- 
l i c e  departments.  County s h e r i f f  departmentq f o r  example, a r e  f r e -  
quent ly .headed  by a n  e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l .  A s h e r i f f  who se rves  by d i r e c t  
e l e c t i o n  is  answerable t o  everybody and everybody's bus iness ,  a s  we 
know, is ,nobody's bus iness .  A p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  may be a b l e  t o  f o r c e  
some a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  on i t s  nominees b u t  t h e  comparative weakness of 
.American p o l i t i c a l  par t ies t i in-many- l o c a l e s  >al lows ) e l e c t e d '  o f f i c i a l s  
t o  win:-party inomination wi thout  organizati!onall support  i n  m a n y ~ ~ c a s e s .  
-Furthermore;':an e l e c t e d  )of f  ic ia l l  s e rves -  f o r .  a -  specified; ' term and - ; 
cannot be, removed'lduring h i s  : tenure short:.ofA- ther;mostttg'rossd~of f ense  . 
-: .< r r, l ,  i In; c o n t r a s t  , : i I s rae l .~has  : the~*most  d i r e c t  and,-specif i c ~ a c c o u n t -  
a b i l i t y ,  imaginable; '-The head->of t h e  p o l i c e  must answer f o r  a l l .  h i s  
dec i s ions  t o ~ a  , s i n g l e i  l s p e c i f  i e d -  of f ic ia l -who:~c~osely~~rndni tors  . h i -  
a c t i o n s .  While h i s  Min i s t e r  f u n c t i o n s . i n  p a r t  t o  insulate:;h$hi.~ff6m 
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ammunition t h a t  could do damage t o  t h e  Nixon admin i s t r a t i on .  V u l n e r a b i l i t y  
t o  p o l i t i c a l  blackmail  i s  one 'of t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  widespread u s e  of 
cove r t  and i l l e g a l  ope ra t ions  i n  a  democrat ic  s o c i e t y .  But, i n  addi- 
t i o n ,  M r .  Hoover had a n  independent p o l i t i c a l  fo l lowing  i n  t h e  popu- 
l a t i o n .  Furthermore, h i s  suppor te rs .over lapped  heav i ly  w i t h  Nixon 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  suppor t e r s  and h i s  open h o s t i l i t y  would have c rea t ed  
a  sharp  cleavage i n  t h e . r a n k s .  . 
A s i m i l a r  p o l i t i c a l  independence i s  found i n  a number of 
American c i t i e s .  Before he  became Mayor of Ph i l ade lph ia ,  then  p o l i c e  
ch i e f  Frank Rizzo was a  major p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e  t h a t  t h e  incurnbent.Mayor 
/ 
Tate  could ill a f f o r d  t o  antagonize.  A p o l i c e  command wi th  independknt 
p o l i t i c a l  suppor t  is  l e s s  dependent on c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t y  and, t o  
t h a t  e x t e n t ,  is  , i n s u l a t e d  from p res su res  t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  w i l l  of t h a t  
a u t h o r i t y .  
No such independence e x i s t s  among the  I s r a e l i  p o l i c e .  There 
have been a  few f i g u r e s  i n  I s r a e l i  p o l i t i c s  w i th  t h i s  k i n d . o f  independence 
bu t  t he  . In spec to r  General of t h e . P o l i c e  has  never been one 'o f  them. 
Nor i s  i t  l i k e l y  t h a t  any Inspec to r  General who seemed t o  be developing 
such independent power would l a s t  very  long i n  h i s  o f f i c e .  
The Georgian Episode 
A concre te  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of p o l i c e  deference  t o  t h e  government 
i n  t h e  handl ing of p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s  occurred i n  t h e  summer 
of 1973 i n  t h e  p o r t  c i t y  of Ashdod. Ashdod i s  a new c i t y ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  
dur ing  t h e  mid 1 9 6 0 f s ,  t o  s e r v e  a s  a  second mediterannean p o r t - c i t y  f o r  
t h e  southern  p a r t  of I s r a e l .  Ashdod has  a  predominantly immigrant 
popula t ion  wi th  a  h i g h  percentage of Jews from Middle Eas t e rn  and North 
Afr ican  o r i g i n .  Recent ly,  wi th  t h e  beginning of t h e  l a t e s t  wave of 
Russian immigration, i t s  population..has come t o  i nc lude  s e v e r a l  hundred 
f a m i l i e s  from Georgia i n  t h e  Sovie t  Union. 
A t  t h e  beginning of t h e  summer of 1973, some f o r t y  Georgian 
workers,  who had been employed a s  temporary dock workers during t h e  
peak of t h e  c i t r u s  expor t . s eason ,  were.layed-off(a1ong w i t h  o t h e r  
temporary workers) a s  . t h e  .peak season  passed.  Within a few days, 
s e v e r a l  hundred Georgians%sei.zed c o n t r o l  of t he  c i t y  of Ashdod.' O r -  
ganized i n  smal l  groups, they occupied s e v e r a l  s t r , a t e g i c  p o s i t i o n s  
such a s  t h e  municipal bu i ld ing ,  t h e  . p o r t ,  and roads connect ing t h e  
c i t y  w i t h  the  r e s t  of t h e  country.  They stopped a l l  t r a f f i c  from 
moving i n t o  o r  o u t ' o f  town, ha l t ed  p u b l i c  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  and, of 
course ,  a l l  work a t  t h e  po r t .  Although a c t u a l  v io l ence  was minimal, 
s e v e r a l  persons who at tempted t o  by-pass t he  Georgian guards - a t  t h e  
blockades were bea ten  and one o r  two h igh  ranking p o r t  o f f i c i a l s  were 
kidnapped. The p r o t e s t e r s  demanded t h e  immediate r e h i r i n g  of a l l  
t h e  Georgian workers.who had been f i r e d .  
During t h e  f i r s t  few hours of t h e  con f ron ta t ion ,  t h e  p o l i c e  
had i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r c e  on hand t o  t ake  a c t i o n  had they so  des i r ed  
(due t o  t h e  absence of p a r t  of t h e  r e g u l a r  f o r c e  on temporary ass ign-  
ment elsewhere) .  However, w i t h i n  a few hours ,  t h e  p o l i c e  accumulated 
s u f f i c i e n t  manpower t o  handle t h e  t e c h n i c a l  a s p e c t s  of f o r c e f u l l y  re- 
moving t h e  blockade. 
I t  is  inconce ivable  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c e  would have taken a c t i o n  
a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  however, without  t h e  . e x p l i c i t . c o n s e n t  of c i v i l i a n  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  I n  f a c t ,  t he  p o l i c e  abs t a ined  from a c t i o n  even i n  t h e  f a c e  
of cons iderable  p u b l i c  p re s su re  t o  i n t e r v e n e  a c t i v e l y .  P r i v a t e  c i t i z e n s  
a s  w e l l  a s  o f f i c i a l s  i n  va r ious  o r g a n i z a t i o n s . i n  Ashdod demanded immediate 
p o l i c e  a c t i o n .  The atmosphere was t e n s e  and nea r  explosion.  
The c r i s i s  w a s . f i n a l l y  reso lved  through n e g o t i a t i o n  when a 
member of t h e  I s r a ' e l i  cabinet-the M i n i s t e r  of Transportation--rushed 
t o  Ashdod and nego t i a t ed  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  t h e  l e a d e r s  of t h e  p r o t e s t e r s .  
During t h e  many hours  of nego t i a t i on ,  t h e  p o l i c e  remained s i l e n t l y  
i n  t h e  background, An agreement was reached under which t h e  essence  
of t h e  p r o t e s t e r s  derpand was met and t h e  blockade was v o l u n t a r i l y  
l i f t e d  wi thout  p o l i c e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o r  a r r e s t s .  
a 
Although the  p o l i c e  encountered some c r i t i c i s m  f o r  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  
t o  t ake  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  such ove r t  law v i o l a t i o n s  a s  a s s a u l t ,  d i s r u p t i o n  
of t r a f f i c ,  and even kidnapping, most members of t h e  I s r a e l i  pub l i c  
probably recognized t h a t  t he  p o l i c e  were a misplaced t a r g e t  f o r  c r i t i c i s m  
--or f o r  c r e d i t ,  f o r  t h a t  mat te r .  Nei ther  t h e  p o l i c e  .or t h e  government 
at tempted t o  h ide  o r  would f e e l  any r eason  t o  h i d e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t he  
d e c i s i o n  on how t o  a c t  r e s t e d  wi th  the  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  no t  w i th  
t h e  p o l i c e .  
The s i t u a t i o n  had obvious and major n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r a m i f i c a t i o n s .  It contained the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a v i o l e n t  c l a s h  between 
two e t h n i c  groups (Moroccans and Georgians) thereby sharpening an  i n t e r -  
n a l  c leayage whichwould th rea t en  and undercut  t h e  important  of 
n a t i o n a l  u n i t y .  I t  contained the  f u r t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a v i o l e n t  
c l a s h  between p o l i c e  and Georgian immigrants w i th  g r e a t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
h o s t i l e  propaganda (e.g., a '  photograph of a n  I s r a e l i  policeman clubbing 
a Sovie t  immigrant) t h a t  would have undermined t h e  government's goal  
of 'encouraging such immigration. 
. . 
P o l i c e  d f f i c i a l s  and c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  would be of one mind 
i n  s ee ing  t h e  Georgian episode a s  q u i t e  p rope r ly  d w i n a t e d . b y  p o l i t i c a l  
considerations of the sort mentioned above, not as merely a technical 
matter of law enforcement. Neither would argue that the handling of 
such a situation should be left to either the local police commander 
or even to police at the national Level. The naturalness of a member 
of the national cabinet handling the negotiatfon would be-taken for 
granted in such a highly politicized and centralized society. 
Variable Aspects of Police Partisanship in Israel 
We have argued that civilian centrol of the police is so much 
higher in Igrael than in the United States in general that it is not 
a$ meaningful to ?sk about the specific situations in which police 
are likely to take partisan action in a social conflict situation. 
Is it meaningful at all to ask the question? control remains' a rela- - 
tive mbtter and even with respect to Israel, it is wsrkl-exploring 
the operation of the specific variables suggested in our second set 
of hypotheses: reqlection of societal cleavages within civilian authority, 
political sub-culture among the police, rank-and-file police organiza- 
tion, and normative commitment to due process among the police. To 
anticipate our conclusion, we will argue that relative to the American 
police, the facjtors making for partisan interventiorpbre more attenuated. 
Thus, even if the general control of civilian authority over the police 
were diminished in Israel, there is less reason to expect partisan 
police action to be a problem. We explo=e this argument by examining 
bach of our variables in turn: 
Reflection of societal cleavages within civilian authority 
1 < 
over the police. Major social cleavages in Israel are, to a consider- 
* /  
able extent, reflected within civilian authority over the police. There 
are four major cleavages worth considering: social class, religious- 
secu la r ,  . e thn ic ,  and a  p o l i t i c a l  cleavage center ing  on the  "r ight"  
. . 
of I s r a e l  t o  the  t e r r i t o r i e s  occupied i n  t h e  six-day war and most 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  West Bank. It i s  our content ion  t h a t  each of these 
c 1 e a v a g e s . i ~  substantially.represented wi th in  the  r u l i n g  c o a l i t i o n .  
\ 
The l abor  p a r t y ,  of course, has  the  'support of many middle 
c l a s s  groups a s  we l l  a s  t r a d i t i o n a l  b l u e  c o l l a r  workers. With r e spec t  
t o  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  cleavage, not  only is  t h e  National  Religious Par ty  
a  pa r tne r  i n  the  r u l i n g  c o a l i t i o n ,  but  many r e l i g i o u s  Jews a r e  l o y a l  
suppor ters  of the  labor  pa r ty  r a t h e r  than  of one of t h e  r e l i g i o u s  
p a r t i e s .  Regarding t h e  e thn ic  cleavage, t h e r e  i s  a  very  a c t i v e  at tempt 
on t h e , p a r t  of t h e  l abor  pa r ty  t o  r ep resen t  both  O r i e n t a l  and Western 
Jews al though t h e  l a t t e r  continue t o  dominate the  h ighes t  pos i t ions .*  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  labor  pa r ty  has f o r  many years ,  walked a  t i g h t  rope be- 
tween r i g h t  wing and l e f t  wing f a c t i o n s  on pol icy  toward the  t e r r i -  
t o r i e s  and the  pa r ty  inc ludes  under i t s  umbrella a  broad spectrum; 
fuythermoye, i t s  c o a l i t i o n  pa r tne r ,  t h e  National  Religious Par ty ,  
a s s e r t s  h i s t o r i c a l  claims t o  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n s :  of the  occupied 
. . 
t e r r i t o r y .  ' 
Note how t h e  presence of t h e s e  cleavages a f f e c t  the  po l i ce .  
Religious demonstrations, f o r  example, a r e  q u i t e  f requent  i n  I s r a e l  
on many d i f f e r e n t  ' i s s u e s  inc luding c i v i l  marriage, au tops ies ,  viola-  
. t i o n s  of the  .sabbath, and o ther  a l l eged  o f fenses  a g a i n s t  Jewish re- 
: l i g i o u s  p r a c t i c e ,  These demonstrations f requent ly  involve the  taunt- 
ing  oT po l i ce ,  rock throwing and o t h e r  provocat ions.  The p o t e n t i a l  
c o s t  t o  the  p o l i c e  f o r  mishandling such a  s i t u a t i o n  i s  enormous. It 
*The only cabinet  min i s t e r  of Or ien ta l  o r i g i n  happens t o  be 
the  Minis ter  of Pol ice .  
i s  hard t o  imagine a worse nightmare f o r  t h e  I s r a e l i  p o l i c e  than  
(say)  a newspaper p i c t u r e  of a policeman bea t ing  an orthodox Jew 
i n  f u l l  r e l i g i o u s  garb.  
The n e t  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  u se  t h e  p o l i c e  
a g a i n s t  r e l i g i o u s  demonstrators  w i t h  k i d  gloves and expect  t h e  p o l i c e  
t o  wear t h e  same gear .  Although r e l i g i o u s  demonstrators  have com- 
p la ined  t o  us  about  p o l i c e  roughness, t h e i r  examples, t o  those  f a m i l i a r  
w i th  p o l i c e  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  have a qua in tnes s  about them. The 
major p o l i c e  weapon f o r  t h e  c o n t r o l  of  such demonstrat ions i s  a wagon 
t h a t  s q u i r t s  b l u e  water .  It l a c k s  t h e  power t o  s q u i r t  wh i l e  moving 
s o  i t s  h a l t  i s  a s i g n a l  f o r  demonstrators  t o  s c a t t e r  qu ick ly  o r  g e t  
doused. And a s  one observer  t o l d  us ,  b i t h  i nd igna t ion ,  i t  sometimes 
takes  a s  many a s  f o u r  o r  f i v e  washings t o  remove t h e  s t a i n .  While 
t h e  p o l i c e  a r e  no t  popular  wizh r e l i g i o u s  demonstrators ,  t h e i r  be- 
havior  has  no t  become a w j o r  i s s u e  and t h e r e  have been no l a s t i n g  
s c a r s  frpm t h e  minor c l a s h e s  t h a t  have occurred.  
& 
A s i m i l a r  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  g e t  p u l l e d  i n t o  a con f ron ta t ion  i s  
apparent  i n  t he  handl ing  of many l a b o r  d i s p u t e s .  We r e g u m  t o  t h e  
p o r t  of Ashdod f o r  f u r t h e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n .  During an  e a r l i e t  l a b o r  
d i s p u t e  between r e g u l a r  dock workers and t h e , P o r t  Author i ty ,  s t r i k i n g  
workers chained s h u t  t h e  main g a t e  t o  t h e  Por t .  The P o r t  Author i ty  
c a l l e d  the  p o l i c e  t o  reopen t h e  ga te .  P o l i c e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  he re  con- 
t a ined  t h e  r i s k s  d i scussed  above-a c l a s h  between s t r i k e r s  and p o l i c e  
might occur .  I f  t h i s  happened, i t  i s  reasonable t o  expect  t h a t ,  t h e  
angered workers would have brought p r e s s u r e . t o  bea r  on t h e  p o l i c e  
through suppor t e r s  i n  t h e  government, i nc lud ing  those  w i t h  d i r e c t  
a u t h o r i t y  over t he  p o l i c e .  It i s  no t  s u r p r i s i n g ,  then, t h a t . t h e  p o l i c e  
showed a  marked r e l u c t a n c e  t o  i n t e rvene .  The,Ashdod p o l i c e  commander 
agreed t o  send a  u n i t  on ly  a f t e r  t h e  P o r t  manager had made h i s  r eques t  
i n  wr i t i ng .  When the  p o l i c e  a r r i v e d ,  n e g o t i a t i o n s  were held wi th  t h e ,  
s t r i k e r s  t o  persuade them t o  open t h e  ga t e .  Only a f t e r  t hese  a t tempts  
f a i l e d  d i d  a  policeman c u t  t h e  cha ins  and open t h e  g a t e ,  a n  a c t  which 
0 
t h e  s t r i k i n g  workers d i d  not  r e s i s t  a t  t h i s  po in t .  Thus, no c l a s h  took 
p l a c e  and t h e  p o l i c e  avoided becoming embroiled a s  p r o t a g o n i s t s  i n  a 
con£ l i c t  , 
"Si t - ins , "  a l though not  u s u a l l y  c a l l e d  t h i s ,  a r e  a  common form 
of p r o t e s t  i n  I s r a e l i  s o c i e t y .  There i s  a  long h i s t o r y ,  f o r  example, 
of imrnigrant.groups r e f u s i n g  t o  accep t  t h e  housing o f f e red  them by t h e  
~ i n i s t r ~  of Absorption and unde r l in ing  t h e i r  demands by simply s q u a t t i n g  
where they were--for example, a t  t he  a i r p o y t .  It i s  common f o r  o t h e r  
. b - 
groupp pursuing claims a g a i n s t  one o r  another  m i n i s t r y  t o  occupy the  
o f f i c e s  of t h e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  ques t ion  and r e f u s e  t o  leave .  
The p o l i c e  c l e a r l y  regard  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  such d i s p u t e s  wi th  
g rea t .  : d i s t a s  t e  and t h e r e  is consfderable  evidence t h a t  they in t e rvene  
. .. w i t h  marked r e luc t ance .  An o f f i c i a l  c a l l i n g  t h e  p o l i c e  i n  such a  case  
, . 
must convince them t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no a l t e r n a t i v e .  I n  t he  process ,  t he  
p o l i c e  w i l l  f r e q u e n t l y  put  p re s su re  on t h e  o f f i c i a l  i n  ques t ion  t o  
resume f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  We were t o l d  of one.case,  f o r  example, 
i n  which t h e  o f f i c i a l  c a l l i n g  t h e  p o l i c e  had re fused  t o  t a l k  f u r t h e r  
w i th  a  group occupying t h e  premises.  The p o l i c e  commander i n  ques t ion  
made it c l e a r  t h a t  he w o u l d n o t  a c t  t o  remove the  p r o t e s t i n g  group 
u n l e s s  the  o f f i c i a l  would r e c e i v e  a  d e l e g a t i o n  from t h e  p r o t e s t e r s  
t o  t a l k  fu r ther .  When t h i s  condition was accepted, the remainder 
of the  p ro tes te r s  vo lun ta r i ly  dispersed and the pol ice  r o l e  ended. '  
\ 
The process of applying fo r  a demonstration pefmit i1l;s- 
t r a t e s  a s imilar  s tance i n  many cases. I s r a e l i  law requires t ha t  
a group intending to  hold a p o l i t i c a l  demonstration must apply t o  
the D i s t r i c t  Commander of the ~ o l i c e  i n  t h e i r  area  several  days 
i n  advance to obta in  permission. However, the pol ice  claim tha t  
they w i l l  not usually intervene i n  a technical ly  " i l l ega l"  demon- 
s t r a t i o n  ( t ha t  is,  a demonstration without a permit) unless the  
demonstration d i s rup ts  t r a f f i c .  o r  the  demonstrators employi-iziolence. 
I n  other words, the pol ice  e s sen t i a l l y  renounce the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of 
holding a demonstration without a permit a s  a su f f i c i en t  reason f o r  
in tervent ion.  
One might ask,  then, why have such a law i n  the f i r s t  place 
when the  same c r i t e r i a  a r e  applied t o  both l ega l  and i l l e g a l  demon- 
s t r a t i ons?  The answer is  t h a t  the  process of applying fo r  a permit 
is  an important opportunity fo r  s o c i a l  control.. I s r a e l i  pol ice ,  l i k e  
pol ice  anywhere e l se ,  regard demonstrations a s  a t  bes t  a nuisance. 
Regardless of content, they make extra-work fo r  the  pol ice  and d ive r t  
resources from what they regard as  "real" police work. Handling 
'demons t r a  t lons  is, a t  . t h i s  , ' level ,  l i k e  handling the -unruly crowd and 
t r a f f i c  sna r l s  a t  a soccer game. It i s  to le ra ted  a s  legi t imate  but  
something that%makes l i f e  t ha t  much more bothersome fo r  them. Demon- 
s t r a t i o n s ,  however', unl ike  soccer games, have an addi t ional ,  much 
more dangerous element f o r  the  police.  Since they involve p o l i t i c a l  
i ssues ,  they inevi tably  have the po ten t ia l  f o r  bringing the po l ice  i n t o  
an uneasy or  harmful re la t ionship  with the p o l i t i c a l  au tho r i t i e s  over them. 
When a group planning to hold a demonstration cemes to. the police 
, . 
to apply for a.permit, it presents the police with an opportunity. There 
. . 
is a built in conflict-of-interest between the challenging group and the 
police in this situation which has nothing whatsoever to do with the con- 
': tent of the group's protest: The challenging group is interested in 
. ' maximizing the.visibility and size of its demonstration; the polgce in 
'maximizing its manageability. For the ,representatives of the demonstra- 
. . 
. . 
'tors', this means that the more central the site, the better.. The process 
of applying for a permit is one of negotiation over this central conflict. 
The police suggest routes or locations that will make it possible for 
them to maintain a flow of traffic and to disperse the demonstrators, if 
this becomes necessary, with a minimum of bystander involvement and 
property damage. The demonstrators suggest routes that will maximize the 
awareness of their cause among the public and provide the maximum number 
of witnesses for excessive police force if-used against them. In the 
process of negotiation, the police frequently exact promises from 
demonstration leaders in exchange for police acquiescence in more public 
routes. At the same time, they attempt to deter demonstrators from using 
violence or interfering with freedom of movement by threatening them with 
arrest if they do. Finally, they use the time before the demonstration 
. . 
' .. . . . . 
. . 1 ' :  - - . .  : fo contact.third parties with presumed influence over the demonstrators 
to enlist their aid in ensuring that the demonstration wiLlremain peace- 
I ~ ful and manageable. Thus, a larger system of social control-is activated 
. . 
thrbugh the process of permit application. 
An "extremist" group is one which does.not"threaten to activate a 
major cleavage through its protest. Such groups are.not . . protected by the 
constraint against police intervention described. above. . . The police may 
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or may not intervene in a particular instance but, if they do, the inter- 
vention is considerably less perilous. To be caught beating a leftist 
student is a minor embarrassment which can be handled in the standard 
way of establishments everywhere--by identifying the victim with dis- 
credited political groups. Political isolation, in Israel as in the 
United States, removes a major constraint against partisan intervention 
by the police. 
2. Political Sub-culture. Several observers of the American 
police have argued that they form a group with a distinctive world view. 
William Westley (1970) describes them as a "social group which tends to 
be in conflict with and isolated from the community; and in which the noms 
are independent of the community." Rodney Stark (1972, p. 86) suggests 
that "it is fruitful to think of the police as themselves constituting 
a fairly distinct sub-culture, much akin to ethnic and religious mi- 
norities." He goes on to argue that the police sub-culture has a par- 
ticular political and social content that brings it ikto conflict with 
the sub-culture of blacks and other racial minorities "as well as with 
the subcultureof political and social dissenters, both students and 
adult. . ." 
The content centers on conceptions of social disorder. "At one 
extreme are what have been called low-risk conceptions. From this point 
of view, the stability of public order is seen as fragile and thus that 
the maintenance of a free society requires unqualified respect for law 
and authority. The limits of variability and protest must be held to 
a narrow range, lest anarchy ensue.; Threats to these standards or.order 
must be put down quickly and firmly. High-risk conceptions of order, 
on the other hand, regard the social bases of order as considerably more 
durable; capable of sustaining considerable challenge and dissaray. From 
. .  . ;  . the point of view of high rgsk conceptions, it seems feasible and 
desirable,to.run greater chances of disorder in the interests of individual 
liberty,-diversity, and keeping the legal system responsive to changing 
. . 
. . . . demands" (1972, p. 88) . 
The police, .Stark goes on.to.argue, represent a sub-culture with 
ari extremely low-risk conception of .order. . "They are trained to regard 
anything that is slightly out of the ordinary or irregular as suspicious-- 
a potential threat to order." (1972, p. 88).  
The nature of police work is such that, in any country there are 
likely to be forces pushing the police toward a low-risk conception of 
order. ... A . stable environment implies predictability and.the possibility 
ofs.rou$inizing and rendering more safe interactions that have a high 
potentia1fn:dEctand violence. Much of the social cost of internal 
.., . ' . :conf$Jct 'is borne by the police .and it is particularly easy for them to, 
. . 
focus blame on the challenging group that is rocking the boat rather 
than on some abstract, structural source of conflict. 
No doubt some of the same forces operate on Israeli police but 
they operate in a society with a generally high degree of minor disorder 
in public life. One can hardly witness the daily disarray of.crowds 
: boarding a bus or entering a theatre or of.constant.minor but noisy 
challenges in public.bureaucmies, and fear the ,imminent breakdown of 
the social order. Police are accustomed to a level of challenge.and 
disarray that an American policeman would likely regard as intolerable. 
If 1s;aeli police hive a distinctive political sub-culture, then, 
. :. 
it is . not . a very.visible one. Various observers and participants whom 
we 'have interviewed have expressed the suspicion that police hold' one 
. .  . 
' .  or another view in,d.isproportional numbers. But these generalizations 
turn out to be based on beliefs about the population from which the 
police are recruited. Knowing that rank and file police are drawn 
primarily from lower class and working class communities of Oriental 
origin, observers attribute to the police the views they associate with 
those communities. They do not suggest that socialization into the 
police and its informal norms significantly affects such attitudes.. 
Perhaps it is symptomatic that while there are a wide variety of nick- 
names for American police (e.g., cops, fuzz, screws, pigs, the Man), there 
are no common nicknames for their Israeli counterpart. 
The relative absence of a distinctive political sub-culture among 
Israeli police removes a potential support for partisan intervention. 
Lacking normative support for intervention against particular groups, 
they are less likely to perceive confrontations as opportunities to 
punish the disliked. Of course, they reflect general societal norms and 
when dealing with pariah groups they will still tend to give vent to 
those hostile feelings which they share with the general public. 
3. Rank and File Police Organization. The internal control 
structure of the Israeli police is a tight one. Police unions do not 
exist. There is no analogy to the situation in some Departments in the 
United States where a police chief must walk a tight rope between the 
demands of "the men" and those of his political superiors. Rank and 
file police in.Israel'do things that the higher officers don't approve 
of--this is in the nature of much police work,which necessarily takes 
place where it cannot be closely monitored. But the control problems 
are aggregated individual ones rather than the product of organization 
into independent power units. Once again, Israeli police, compared to 
their American counterparts, lack a structural base for independent, 
. . 
partisan intervention. Even if rank and file Israeli police had strong 
hostility to a challenging group, it would be much more difficult for 
them to act on these feelings. Lacking any insulation from sanctions 
through an organization of peers.that migh't protect them against dis- 
ciplinary.action, extra legal acts that are.publicly visible and overt 
carry with them extremely high risks. 
4. Commitment to Due Process. We don't have a reliable basis 
to judge whether the normative commitment of the Israeli police to due 
process is any deeper than that of their American counterparts. We are 
inclined to doubt that it goes much beyond lip service in either country 
but short .of systematic observational data on police encounters which 
. . 
we lack for Israel, it is impossible to know. In neither country would 
. , . we regard the existing commitment to due.process as any kind of ,serious 
. . 
constraint on police partisan intervention. 
Conclusion 
The differences between American and Israeli police explain 
. . . .  why each society has its own special problems in the delicate balance 
of police relations with civilian authority. The Israeli police have 
. . . . considerably less insulation from political authority than do most 
. . 
. . .  
American police forces. The accountability is more direct and police 
officials have no independent political base with which to counter the 
demands of political authority. American police typically have greater 
independence and ability to resist civilian authority. 
At the same time, American police have.both a greater impdlse 
and greater organizational support for independent political action. 
They possess a more distinctive political sub-culture and powerful 
rank-and-file organizations in many jurisdictions-enable them to act 
collectively more easily. Israeli police lack both the impulse and the 
wherewithal for such independent political action. 
For American police, then, the dilemma of too much independence 
remains a real one. Unfortunately, as Watergate has made clear, the 
alternative danger is also present. To tight,en control over the police 
0 
without sufficient restraint on political authorities themselves is to 
invite a cure as bad or worse than the disease. 
The Israeli problem is, in this sense, a simpler one. The danger 
that the Israeli police will become an indepeydent political force is 
negligible while the alternative danger that it will become a dependent 
political instrument of the government is real. The potential for em- 
ploying the police for partisan purposes under the camouflage of national 
needs remains an important.concernt In such a situation, increased 
police independence becomes an acceptable risk. 
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